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The new model of the products development and distribution
represented by the open source movement has an important impact
on the composition of the software market because it is a system
alternative to the proprietary model. The antitrust analysis of the
software market has to value, therefore, the strong effect of the open
source development and distribution on the market contendibility
and on the effectiveness to substitute the proprietary scheme. [JEL
Classification: K21, L11]
1. - Introduction
The relationship between the two terms of the hendiadys,
open source software and antitrust law, is both difficult to outline
and hard to settle.
In order to specify the link between them, we will try to define
the two different aspects of the question: the competitive
contribution to software markets from the new model of the
products development and distribution (i.e. OSS model) and the
rôle played by the competition law on the development of OSS1.
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1 We will try, in particular, to make a direct compararison of the terms of the
hendiadys, not in the antagonistic form — that is the field in which the lawyer
practises his method — but rather with the common aim of an increase in
competition.
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First of all, we have to give a brief introduction to two general
problems.
The first important problem is connected with the
unsuitability of the “classic” antitrust law to deal, using traditional
analysis tools, with the competitive issues concerning competion,
which are peculiar to the software industry and the new markets
based on Information Technologies. The second more specific but
as delicate problem, regards the definition of open source software
and its specific importance for the antitrust law.
2. - “Old” Antitrust and “New” Regulation on Information 
Technology Markets
The inadequacy of the antitrust law to understand the
peculiarities of some of the new economy products and to give a
correct evaluation of the issues concerning competition of the
related markets, is not a new subject. 
This was already stated, without success, by Microsoft in
order to avoid the charge of monopolization brought against it by
the US Government2 and afterwards proposed by the same
software house in the proceedings under Article 82 of the EC
Treaty developed by the European Commission3. 
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The rôle of antitrust enforcement is still to verify, because still there are no
decisions of antitrust Authorities as regards the competitive compatibility of the
development and distribution systems defined open source. See, for remarks
regarding this aspect, the obiter dicta of the decisions on the two Microsoft’s cases,
infra, notes 3-4. 
2 See, on the US case, Distict Court of United States, District of Columbia,
April 3, 2000, Foro it., 2000, IV, 229, with notes by RENDA A. (2000).
At first Microsoft Corp. was condemned to a compulsory division in two firms,
for the production of operative systems and the carrying out of applications
respectively. Afterwards Judge Jackson’s decision – which was talked about a lot
– was corrected by the Court of Appeal [US v. Microsoft, 253 F. 3d 34 (D.C. Cir.
June 28, 2001)] and lastly, Microsoft and Department of Justice came to a consent
decree, issued by Judge Kollar Kotelly on November 12, 2002 (available on the
site www.dcd.uscourts.gov). On the inadequacy of old antitrust law in the regulation
of IT markets, see RENDA A. (2004), where is a critical appraisal on the open source
initiative with regard to the US Final Judgement.
3 See the text of the EU Commission’s decision, March 24, 2004, available online
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decision/37792/en.pdf (last
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However, in this case, too, the question of contention has not
yielded the expected result and has not prevented EC Authorities
from condemning Microsoft for abuse of its dominant position on
the market.
In the antitrust proceedings it was pointed out that, as regards
markets with strong network and learning effects, like those we
are dealing with, firms try to make “de facto” standards in order
to get high and long-lasting market power4, with strong tipping
effects against clients and producers of complementary goods5. 
Under such circumstances, products, quickly becoming
obsolescent, and the natural evolution of technical standards are
factors unable to guarantee, on their own and without corrections,
new comers’ entry into the market and a reduction in the market
power, held by the standard’s owner, who can always rely on a
strong advantage over the competitive pressure of new entrants. 
The antitrust analysis, if correct, is able to understand and,
if necessary, to correct the competitive dynamics of the software
industry.
The problems related to the antitrust enforcement on these
markets, are probably different: firstly, the very long times of the
proceedings6 and secondly, the enforcement of effective remedies
suitable for the seriousness of the infringement of the antitrust law. 
The recent proposal to establish regulations on some aspects
of the networks architecture and the use of operative standards
— by analogy with what happens in the field of electronic
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visited on August 22, 2005), especially at paragraph 456, where Microsoft’s allegations
on the inadequacy of the structuralist remedy in order to regulate competition on
the IT markets, are quoted.
For the critical notes on the decision under EC Treaty, see PARDOLESI R. (2004);
PARDOLESI R. - RENDA A. (2004).
4 This is the case of the operating system Windows, which the Commission
has defined “not only the dominant product of the market, … but the de facto
standard operative system product for client PCs” (Commission’s decision, March
24, 2004, supra note 3, paragraph 472).
5 See, Commission’s decision, March 24, 2004, supra note 3, and the critic
notes of PARDOLESI R. (2004); for a competitive analysis of the network effects and
the network dynamics, KATZ M.J. - SHAPIRO C. (1985).
6 The proceedings were begun by the European Commission and lasted more
than 5 years and almost the same time was necessary to define the Settlement
Agreement which has concluded the trial among Microsoft, US Government and
some of the States of the Union. About it, see infra, paragraph 7.
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communications — should be considered in a de iure condendo
perspective7.
The experience achieved both in Italy8 and abroad9 on
network services markets — for a long time now subjected to ex
ante regulations — clearly shows the limits of a solely regulating
intervention and the necessity of antitrust control cooperating
with and completing the sectorial Authorities’ one. 
3. - Open Source Software Definition …
The other preliminary question to deal with regards the
definition of open source software and its significance for the
antitrust law. 
The interpreter can use the notion which is supplied on this
subject by the interested people10 and which seems to coincide
with the definition recently accepted by the European Commission
in the Microsoft decision11. 
With software open source we mean all the software supplied
and distributed on the basis that their source code is available
and freely modifiable by the licensee. These programs do not seem
to differ from proprietary programs (for instance Microsoft’s
operating system Windows) in their technical contents and the use
they are designed for, rather, they are different from the
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7 See PARDOLESI R. - RENDA A. (2004); PARDOLESI R. - GRANIERI M. - GIANNACCARI
A. - COLANGELO G. (2004).
The point of balance between the two terms of the architecture (which defines
the technical means) and of control (on the contents) could be established through
an information policy which regulates, moreover, the restrictions based on
intellectual property rights. 
8 See, in Italy, Telsystem/Sip, Boll. 1-2/1995, leading case of a period of large
use, from the Italian Authority, of the essential facilities doctrine also on markets,
like that of the telephone service, which were regulated by a new law on
privatizations; for an exhaustive analysis of this matter, see GUGLIELMETTI G. (1998). 
9 See Supreme Court of United States, January 13, 2004, Verizon
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 124 S.Ct. 872 (2004)
(No. 02-682) with the notes by GIANNACCARI A. (2004) and by OSTI C. (2004). 
10 See for instance, the definition of Free Software Foundation, on the website
www.fsf.org.; the Foundation has also created the GPL license which regulates the
distribution of the open source software: see infra, paragraph 3.
11 See Commission’s decision, supra note 3, paragraph 26.
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proprietary model in the licensing method (distribution of open
source, in fact, allows free redistribution of the software without
royalties or other fees paid to the author. The source code is to
be distributed with the software or otherwise made available,
through download from Internet almost free of charges or at least
at a price not higher than the cost of reproduction. The licence
is also to allow anyone to modify the software or derive other
software from it, and to redistribute the modified software under
the same licence terms12.
The many kinds of open source licences are characterised by
some common elements, which are part of the well-known General
Public License, created by the Free Software Foundation13, that is:
I) availability and accessibility of the source code.
The computer program must contain the source code and,
in any case, the distributor must make it available, typically
through download from Internet, at the same cost as that
(tending to zero) of reproduction. The license must allow the
distribution of the program both in the form of source code, and
in the form of object code; the former is to be the elective form
of the modification of the program, even if it is absolutely
forbidden to black out the source code or make its modification
more difficult.
II) freedom of modification and redistribution.
This is a faculty connected with the availability of the source
code and it binds each user, who wants to redistribute the program
(original or in the modified form) to preserve the power to use,
modify and distribute the source code for the next users of the
program.
It is clear that open source programs do not lack legal
protection (sub specie of copyright), but their model of distribution
is based on the rightful holder waiving the prerogatives granted
to him by the copyright law.
Open Source Software etc.G. OLIVIERI - L. MARCHEGIANI
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12 In any case, the term “free software”, often used (like) as a synonym of “open
source”, does not mean that this kind of programs are distributed at no cost (“free
as a speech, not as beer”), but it means that the powers which normally the
author/developer owns, can be used by every user, without limits from the rightful
holder, on the licence’s conditions.
13 The full text of GNU License is available online at http://www.fsf.org.
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This result is achieved through the use of a particular class
of licenses (i.e. copyleft)14 which contrast with those (called
“proprietary”) based on the copyright exercise.
On the one hand these are suitable to promote (a large
condivision of) source code sharing of all computer programs
which use — though only in part — open source software; on the
other, they prevent the next users of the program or of derivative
products, from appropriating these codes15.
The enforcement of the clauses of the contract — at present
all to verify16 — is assigned, in many cases, to a third party,
typically a non-profit organisation, which pursues the aim of
promoting free software “ideology”. In the case of the Free
Software Foundation, for example, the GPL’s programs developers
transfer the copyright to the Foundation, which commits itself to
exercise it in compliance with its istitutional aims17, in order that
the next users of the program should keep the powers, granted by
the licence, intact. 
According to Professor Moglen, a very important theoriser of
the legal issues of the open source movement, that should permit
a better protection of the programs, especially when the authors
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14 The more used and well-known licences are the already quoted General Public
License — GPL — and the Berkeley Software Development, created by the
homonymous University: see KENNEDY D. (2001); MCGOWAN D. (2001); FITZGERALD B.
- BASSETT G. (2003).
15 The definition of derivative work referring to open source licences is amply
discussed and the solution to this problem is very important for the future de-
velopment of this kind of software: WEBBINK M. in FITZGERALD B. - BASSETT G. (2003).
16 The first case of application and intrerpretation of such clauses was
examined by the Tribunal of Munich, April 14, 2004, which prohibited the
distribution, the reproduction and access to the open source software
“netfilter/iptables” on terms other than those provided by the GPL license, and
bound the next licensees to mention the GPL licence and to make the program’s
source code available at the cost of reproduction. For notes on this case, see
SHANKLAND S. (2004). The other important case which regards the effectiveness of
open source licenses, is SCO v. IBM, infra, paragraph 9.
17 The scope of the Free Software Foundation is described in the organization’s
website: “The Free Software Foundation (FSF), founded in 1985, is dedicated to
promoting computer users’ right to use, study, copy, modify, and redistribute
computer programs. The FSF promotes the development and use of free (as in
freedom) software — particularly the GNU operating system (used widely today in
its GNU/Linux variant) — and free (as in freedom) documentation. The FSF also
helps to spread awareness of the ethical and political issues of freedom in the use
of software”.
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are more than one and the enforcement of the clauses in question
requires a high degree of collaboration among the rightful holders18.
4. - … and its Relevance to the Antitrust Law
The characteristics of open source programs and the
distinction from the proprietary softwares, permit us to establish
their relevance with the competition law. Particularly, we have to
ask us if, and how, the models of production, development and
distribution of open source softwares are to be considered with
autonomous criteria under the one or the other of following sides:
the relevant markets definition; the market shares computation;
the other typical behaviours of open source sphere, among which
the information exchanges and the under cost sales19. 
As regards the relevant markets definition, the matter —
difficult to deny — that the open source programs are not different,
under the technical aspect, from those proprietary and tend to
satisfy the same needs, on side of demand, doesn’t exclude, on
principle, that an autonomous product market can be pointed out. 
In the Microsoft case, for instance, US judges have decided
to exclude from the relevant market — in contradiction with the
same substitution’s criterion — the Apple operating system20.
Moreover, competition’s Italian Authority has recently settled
that the services (in this case, nella specie, works coupons for the
meal) given out by contract to the Public Administration is an
autonomous market because of peculiary public rules which
regulate the contractor choice and the contract drawing21.
Lastly, some forms of good production and distribution, above
all when they affect the costs structure of the firms and its price
Open Source Software etc.G. OLIVIERI - L. MARCHEGIANI
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18 For more details on the Moglen’s approach, visite the site http://emoglen.
law.columbia.edu.
19 And, generally, of the software market.
20 The application of the antitrust law is necessary, in this case, because the
learning effects, typical of network economies, increase the consumer’s costs for
shifting to a new generation product of competitors: DENOZZA F. (2002).
21 Authority’s decision n. 10831, July 13, 2002, Boll. AGCM n. 24/2002. See
also COLANGELO G. (2003). 
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levels, contribute to outline a market sector at least partly distinct
from that of the competitors products22. 
However, this is not the conclusion reached by the antitrust
Authorities, on the two sides of Atlantic, in the evaluation of the
structure and the competitive dynamics of the software industry.
All analysis regarding this matter agree to hold that — as stated
by the European Commission in the Microsoft case — “open
source software has become an established feature of the mainstream
software market” and that the peculiar way of creating and using
open source software, does not justify an autonomous evaluation
from the point of view23. 
Besides, the two kinds of programs often cross each other and
give rise to mixed products which incorporate parts of the
proprietary software and open source components, in confirmation
of the fact that the two kinds of programs compete on the same
markets and that they are intended for the same customers, in spite
of the great difference from each other as regards the modes of
development, production and distribution.
The question is different as to the computation of market shares
which refer to the firms which produce and/or distribute the open
source software. As a matter of fact, in this case, the calculation of
the sales can be misleading because, in many cases, the open source
sofware — as we have seen — is given free of charge. 
Antitrust Authorities, have therefore, reconstructed the fact in
a way partially different from the traditional one, and have
highlighted the product units actually installed (also free of
charge) by the interested firms24. The data resulting from the
employment of this different criterion — even if probably under-
estimated because they do not balance the (many) copies of open
source software downloaded free from the Web — are one way or
another unexpected, at least to the outsiders: among the operating
systems which run Internet’s web pages, for instance, Apache holds
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22 Let’s think, for instance, of the great distribution field and of the rôle played
by discounts.
23 See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (2003, chapter 3, at 44), for a close analysis
of the mainstream markets.
24 Commission’s decision, supra note 3, paragraph 473.
04-Olivieri-Marche_47_68  26-04-2006  15:22  Pagina 54
more than 60% of the market; Linux, probably the best-known of
open source programs, holds 13,4% of the world-wide market
share of the operating systems installed on Work Group Servers.
We must ask ourselves, lastly, if some typical conducts of open
source industry operators should be considered separately if their
conformity with the antitrust law is to be evaluated. 
Let’s think, on the one hand, of the information exchange
underlying the creation and the development of the new open
source software; on the other hand, of the free cession of this
product and its compatibility of this conduct with the prohibition
of predatory pricing.
Moreover, we cannot ignore the specific methods of enforcing
the open source programs copyright, which are frequently
transferred to a non-profit organization (for instance the Free
Software Foundation) with effects not dissimilar, in substance, to
those characterizing collecting societies.
With regard to the first aspect, mentioned above, we believe
that, in the near future, an anticompetitive conduct with restrictive
effects on relevant markets can be adopted by the firms that have a
share in the open source movement, or the many organizations
created to develop and support the programs which enable the users
of open source technologies to develop classes of application based
on standardized and open source-interoperative platforms. In
particular, by promoting the open source software, these people can
exchange information important for competition25 or can conform
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25 It is possibile to violate the antitrust law if competitors discuss or exchange
information regarding: (i) individual company current or projected prices, price
changes, price differentials, markups, discounts, allowances, terms and conditions
of sale, or data that bear on prices, including profits, margins or cost; (ii) industry
pricing policies, price levels, price charges, deifferentials or the like; (iii) changes
in industry production, capacity or inventories; (iv) individual company bids or
intentions to bid for particular products, procedures for responding to bid
invitations or specific contractual arrangements; (v) plans of individual companies
concerning the design, characteristics, production, distribution or marketing or
introduction dates of particolar products, including proposed territories or
customers; (vi) matters relating to actual or potential individual suppliers that might
have the effect of excluding them from any market or of influencing the business
conduct of firms toward such suppliers or customers; (vii) individual company
current or projected cost of procurement, development or manufacture of any
product; (viii) individual company market shares for any product or for all products.
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their conducts as to the development of products to market strategies
or price levels26.
We do not think, however, that these conducts must be
evaluated using criteria different from the consolidated ones
relating to facilitating practises and information exchange between
competitors27.
Equally, we ask ourselves if the subject that holds the rights
of open source authors/developers is in a dominant position on
the relevant market. If so, it must be established if and how from
the subject there can be abuse condemnable under the antitrust
law.
In any case, the criteria to deal with and solve those matters
will not be different from those already used the powers and
behaviours of the various collecting societies appointed to manage
the author’s royalties28.
We must make some other remarks on the system of
remuneration on which the method of development and distribution
of open source software is based, in order to verify its compatibility
with antitrust principles, in general terms, and in particular with the
prohibition of predatory pricing. Seen from this angle, the open
source model has some distinctive peculiarities: on the one hand we
must explain the interest of the author of the program in making
over, seemingly at no price, the results of his work to the community;
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26 See the antitrust policy formed by the Open Source Development Labs Inc.,
in order to make the illegal (competitive) conducts known to the open source
developers: more information is available on the site www.osdl.org.
27 See, the Italian Authority’s decision, n. 8546, July 28, 2000, Boll. AGCM n.
30/2000.
28 See CASSOTTANA M. (1995); in Italy, with regard to SIAE’s activity, see the
decision of Autorithy n. 3195, July 28, 1995, Boll. AGCM n. 30/1995. On the
mutualistic function of the italian authors collecting societies, see the remarks of
MARASÀ G. (1992), and those of SARTI D. (2001). The activity of the Free Software
Foundation is giving services to the copyright holders and to the work users in
order to enforce the rights in the case of limitation of the rights assigned by the
open source licence model. The collecting society can hold a de facto monopoly,
but the mandate to exercise the authors/developers rights is strictly functional to
the effective enforcement of the contractual clauses which grant the free access
and the free modification of the source code. Some aspects related to the economic
exploitment of the work are on the contrary excepted from the Foundation powers:
this fact limits greatly, and probably eliminates at all, the anticompetitive risks of
the collecting system of right’s exercise in the field of the open source softwares.
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on the other hand, it is not clear what is the gain of the firms which
trade in this software. 
There is an answer to both questions. 
First of all, the choice of the program’s author not to make
over his work to the community has a fairly high cost (i.e. the
synchronization cost), rising from the need to adapt the program
to later changes made by other developers. 
In this perspective, “it can be consistent with a Nash
equilibrium to make improvements and to make those improvements
available to others”29. Secondly, they are indirect economic
revenues, which can derive from active sharing in the software
open source development process (for instance, in the form of
work opportunity or of other chances of gain) different from
royalties but equally as interesting as those from the economic
point of view.
Moreover, the companies which deal in open source programs,
do not derive their gains from the sale of these products, but from
the supply of counseling services (which include installation,
personal adaptation and technical assistance) and from the sale
of proprietary software connected to the use of open source
technology. These firms do not supply (only) software, but (also
and mostly) accessory services, for which they bear costs and get
a corresponding price30. 
5. - Open Source and Development Models in the Software
Industry: from the “Cathedral” to the “Bazaar”
The remarks made so far enable us to draw a first methodo-
logical direction of the method in order to correctly plan the study
of the relationship between the open source software and the
antitrust law: the open source is an alternative development model
for the creation and dissemination of computer technologies, but
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29 DWYER G.P. JR., (1999); for more appraisals see also PRASAD G. (2001). 
30 For a specification of the Red Hat’s business model in the Linux softwares
distribution, see WEBBINK M. in FITZGERALD B. - BASSETT G. (2003) with more
indications of business results of the firms.
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as such it has neither, a specific rôle in antitrust issues, nor
requires, as a rule, the use of a method or of concepts different
from those used so far in order to analyse the competitive
dynamics of the software industry. It is not from this point of view
that the importance and originality of open source programs are
pointed out under the competition law. 
Their competitive importance is rather in the ability to offer
the market and the public Authorities delegated to regulate it, a
new pattern of promoting and developing the technological
innovation, which, from its origins, purposes to overthrow the
traditional model, based on the economic exploitment of
intellectual property rights, to its foundations. 
In the “manifesto” of the open source movement31, the
ideological distance between the two models is powerfully
delineated by the image of the cathedral (the proprietary software)
and the bazaar (the open source software). But, in addiction to
the ideal and cultural purposes which vivify the open source
movement, we want to outline the economic efficiency of this
mechanism. 
In this study we can neither funditus analyse the economics
of the open source pattern, nor highlight the great difference, from
the structural and operative aspects, from the proprietary
scheme32. 
However, the open source production model, in spite of
general scepticism, is suitable to yield profits and stay on the
market in the same way (and in the future, even better) as the
products based on the exploitation of intellectual property rights33.
On the contrary, we want to deal, with the subject of
individuation and evaluation of the effects which this new model
of software development can have on the order of related markets
and in general, on the policy of Information Technologies
competition. A few remarks are dedicated to these matters, as
follows.
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31 RAYMOND E. (1999).
32 See TIROLE J. - LERNER J. (2002); PAPPAS JOHNSON J. (2001); DWYER G.P. JR.
(1999).
33 See WEBBINK M. in FITZGERALD B. - BASSETT G. (2003).
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6. - Evaluation of the Two Models in a Competitive 
Perspective. First Conclusions
In the field of the Software and Internet Industry the
improvement happens, as everybody knows, in the form of
incremental innovation, in which well-known elements are
adapted or turned to different uses in a new functionality34. 
Moreover, the software industry is notoriously marked by the
presence of network effects which enhance the product unitary
value for the purchaser with the increase in total units sales35.
The other peculiar feature of Information Technologies, is the
trend to standardization, which consists in a progressive emerging
of uniform technical features through which the dominant firm
is able to consolidate its market power and to delay new
competitors’ entry into the market36. 
Each of the factors, above considered, is potentially suitable
to narrow competition on the markets of which we are dealing
with37. 
However, we cannot deny that the systematic exploitment of
intellectual property rights in a protectionist way, delineated by
the traditional model, considerably increase tipping risks and
exclusionary effects, to the disadvantage of competitors and
consumers, respectively. 
As regards the “classic” model, the open source system —
based on the use of the “copyleft” licenses which allow those
programs to be used and modified by anyone free of charge —
presents evident advantages also (but not only) from the point of
view of competition. 
In particular it shows how it is possibile to stimulate techno-
logical innovation on the sofware market without playing on the
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34 SAMUELSON P. - DAVIS R. - KAPOR M.D. - REICHMAN J.H. (1994); FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (2003).
35 The definition is in ECONOMIDES N. (2001).
36 The IT markets standardization is a global problem of contemporary law:
see, i.a., LEMLEY M. - MCGOWAN D. (1998); PARDOLESI R. - RENDA A. (2000, p. 147);
most recently, GIANNACCARI A. (2004).
37 See, MELI V. (2003); BERTANI M. (2004) and — on Microsoft Commission’s
decision — PARDOLESI R. (2004).
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economic exploitation of the artificial lead time, conceded to the
holder of the exclusive right, but favouring the programs author
inclined to interoperate among themselves in order to achieve new,
more functional, applications. 
This system brings clear advantages to competition. 
On the one hand the open source software distribution can
costitute the means of recovering (or at least of restricting) the
installed-base opportunism which represents one of the less
virtuous effects of standardization. 
On the other hand, we cannot exclude that in dynamic
competition the open source model becomes an effective way of
encouraging research and development.
The fact that a program is distributed so as to making available
the source code can, in fact, costitute, in a near future, strong means
of collecting customers without excluding, in any case, that the
range of undertaking’s products can become rich of proprietary
addictions, like applications or other instruments of documentation. 
We can then conclude on this point affirming that the open
source way is able to play an important pro-competitive rôle,
whether because it is able to effectively oppose the restrictive
effects coming from the use of systems based on proprietary
software, or because it represents a valid alternative model to
improve the technological innovation in information society, on
line with the issues of an important study in regard to other
sectors of scientific research38. 
The foregoing statements can be an interesting reading key
both for the interpretation of the favour of the Government of
many countries for the adoption of open source programs by their
Offices39; and for the interpretation of some recent evolution’s
trends in matter of abuse of dominant position which — although
they do not concern directly the open source programs — can
really involve their development. 
We refer, on the one hand, to the decisions which have
imposed to Microsoft some powerful obligations of disclosure for
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38 REICHMAN J. - UHLIR F. (2003).
39 The legal acknowledgement of open source software in the different countries
is delineated by HAHN R.W. (2002).
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granting the full interoperability of its programs with those of
competitors; on the other hand we refer to EU Court’s decision
on IMS case which confirmed the rule of European Authorithies
in the application of the essential facility doctrine to intellectual
property rights and the possibility of considering that the right’s
holder refusal to supply a license can constitute an abuse under
Article 82 of the EU Treaty.
7. - Impact of Recent Antitrust Decisions on Software Open
Source Development
On weigh the impact of the above mentioned decisions in the
open source software development, we must firstly recall, even if in
synthesis, the content of the obligations imposed to Microsoft by the
US Courts and, more recently, by the EU Commission, respectively. 
In US vs. Microsoft, the engagements provided in the Final
Judgement of November 2002 can be subdivided in two categories,
according to whether they consist in a positive or negative obligation.
Among the first ones, we must classify, first of all, the duty to make
available, even if “for the sole purpose of interoperating with a Windows
operating System product”: a) all the Application Programming
Interfaces — API’s — used by the Microsoft’s Middleware to
interoperate with a Windows operating system product (Sect. III.D);
as well as b) the Communication Protocols installed on client
computers and used to interoperate, or comunicate, natively with a
Microsoft server operating system product (Sect. III.E).
However, while Microsoft engages the duty sub b), even for
the “sole purpose” above mentioned, toward the “third parties” in
general, that one related to the interfaces of applications is
subjectively limited and objectively subordinated to a series of
conditions such as to exclude — someone thinks deliberately —
the open source developers from the access to many of the
Windows API codes40. 
Open Source Software etc.G. OLIVIERI - L. MARCHEGIANI
61
40 For the meaning of the expression “for the sole purpose of interoperating”
see RENDA A. (2004).
04-Olivieri-Marche_47_68  26-04-2006  15:22  Pagina 61
Under the subjective profile, in fact, the Sec. III.J.2 b) assigns
to Microsoft the right of conditioning to the proof of a resonable
business need the access to its API codes; the open source movement
cannot easily prove this condition because it is composed prevalently
by individual programmers and by non profit organizations.
Moreover, the Sec. III.J.2., c) of the Final Judgment, permits
to the Redmond’s software house to allow the access to the
informations above mentioned to those who meet reasonable,
objective standards established by Microsoft itself for certifying
the authenticity and viability of their business.
This can later on limit the number of potential users of the
provision and the chances of the open source movement of turning
it to their advantage. 
Differently, the EU Commission statements41 have not only
imposed a widest information duty on Windows specifications —
which for someone impose to the Redmond’s firm to disclose an
important share of its source code — but specified the addressees
and the scope of this provision, so described:
“Microsoft shall make the Interoperability Information available
to any Undertaking having an interest in developing and distributing
Work Group Server Operating System Product and shall allow the
use of Interoperability Information by such Undertaking for the
purpose of developing and distributing Work Group Server
Operating System Product”.
The wide legal definition of undertaking, in the European
Community law, is too well-known to be recalled. 
It is sufficient to embrace both non profit organizations —
like the Free Software Foundation — and people (professional
men and programmers) who contribute to nourish, by their
initiative, the Open Source movement. 
These subjects have — and this is the biggest difference
between the two versions of the provision — the interest (not only
economic) to know and use Windows interfaces in order to
develop and distribute operating systems compatible (and
competitive) with those of Microsoft. 
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In this case we must come to the conclusion that this
provision is addressed to open source world too.
And it seems even designed with the purpose of supporting,
by means of programs interoperability, the rise of new standards
of operating systems, and it seems to share some principles of the
open source movement.
The EU Court’s decision on the IMS case42, lastly, does not
concern — at first sight — the open source software. It is relevant,
indeed, to specify the essential facility definition referring to a data
base and to delineate the conditions which make the refusal to
supply of the exclusive right’s holder, abusive. 
There is yet a fil rouge which ties this decision, and its
precedents43, to the EU Commission decision on the Microsoft case. 
The relation is evident if we look at the legal bases of the
Commission’s reasoning and at its conclusions. The abuse which
is challenged to Microsoft in the above mentioned proceeding
consists, in fact, in the refusal to supply the technical information
necessary to achieve the full interoperability between Windows
operating systems and its competitors. This refusal can be as
unlawful qualified because, in the Commission’s opinion, recur in
this case the conditions of essential facility rule, as it happened
in the cases Magill, Bronner and IMS, independently by the fact
that most of these information are protected by intellectual
property rights. The fact is that Microsoft holds an “aggregate”
dominant position in both the relevant markets and that the
Windows operating system “is the de facto standard operating
system product for client PCs”44. The refusal to supply the
information necessary to grant the full interoperability of the
programs realised by the competitors with the Windows system is
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as unlawful qualified “due to the indispensability of the input it
refuses to supply to its competitors”45. 
The decision, however, exceedes the essential facility doctrine
frontiers which have been delineated by EU decisions and which
have been recently fixed by the European Court in the IMS case.
Firstly because it considers the three exceptional circumstances in
which that rule consents to restrain the IPRs, and the others
facility holder’s exclusive rights, not peremptorily. Secondly
because the facility definition, really rather indefinite, is
substituted by that of “input”, even less determinated. In the third
place, because in this case the conditions to qualify the
information like “essential” do not seem to exist, at least in the
sense so far asserted by the lawyers. Lastly, because Microsoft’s
refusal neither seems able to prevent any competition form in the
aftermarket, nor to prevent the emersion of products with features
different from those of incumbent. 
We cannot appraise thoroughly the fairness of this statement
and the solidity of its arguments. Its relapses on the competitive
equilibrium of software industry are evident and very important. 
From now onwards, the information necessary to grant the
interoperability with a de facto standard developed by the
incumbent undertaking, will be considered like an essential input
and will be object of disclosure for the purpose to allow that the
competitors develop products able to interoperate with the
standard. The innovation, for its part, will be less conditioned by
the need of realising products compatible with the dominant
standard and the competition among the undertakings will be
more in the market than for the market. This fact will yield
positive effects in open source programs development too.
8. - Antitrust Law and Evaluation of Technological Innovation
The above examined decisions, do not resolve a general
question — which we can here only mention — that is the rôle of
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antitrust Authorities in the evaluation of improvement degree
which is necessary and sufficient to justify the restriction of
incumbent’s exclusive rights. 
As some authors have outlined46, it is not up to the antitrust
Authorities neither to give an opinion, nor express a preference
about the architecture and the development of some technical
standards. Moreover the Authorities do not have the structure able
to evaluate the degree of a product improvement as regards to the
technical background. 
After the IMS and Microsoft decisions, the risk is that the
evaluation on the degree of improvement is a competitive judgement
which asserts that some products, different from those supplied by
the incumbent, are new if there is an actual or potential unsatisfacted
consumer’s demand for them47. This is the sense of Microsoft
decision, in which the disclosure obligation imposed to the standard
holder is expressly justified with the purpose to consent the
development of compatible products — and then, of products which
are substitutes of dominant firm’s products — by the competitor
undertakings48. If this trend will be confirmed and extended to other
sectors of new technologies, the uncertain balance-point between the
IPRs, on the one hand, and the competition law, on the other hand,
risks to move again towards the second one, with some unfavourable
effects under the aspect of innovation incentives too.
9. - SCO vs. IBM Case and Open Source Uncertain Future
After having explained the synergic relationship between the
open source software and the antitrust law, in a perspective of
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common contribution to the technological improvement, we want
to conclude this study with a brief consideration on the future of
this model.
A future which, at the first sight, can appears rosy in reason
to the foregoing appraisals, but which is really made uncertain by
an important issue: the proceeding SCO vs. IBM. 
In this case, SCO (ex Caldera Systems Inc.) claims — as UNIX
copyright holder — the right to prevent the use of some parts of
the UNIX source code for the development of Linux applications49.
The open source movement is worried about the plaintiff purpose
— in case of positive outcome of the lawsuit — to charge with a
licence fee all users of Linux operating systems; moreover it is
also worried about the Court’s interpretation of the copyleft license
clauses and about their inadequacy to preserve the users from the
risk of suits for damages based on the IPRs violation.
Malicious people think that behind the SCO’s initiative there
is the hand (not even very invisibile) of Microsoft Corporation,
which has already demanded and obtained from the plaintiff an
onerous license for the use of those exclusive rights.
The proprietary software, then, compelled to retire from the
front of antitrust law, want a chance of revenge in the field, surely
more favourable for it, of the IPRs, playing on the most effective
of its arguments, that is to say: “the software is mine!”.
The challenge, never extinguished, between intellectual
property and antitrust, go on and will bring many surprises.
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